

OCTOBER 7, 1965

STATINTL

First, an article entitled, "The Speechmaker," which was published in the October 2 issue of the New Republic under the byline of Andrew Kopkind, with a subtitle, "Senator Fulbright as the Arkansas de Tocqueville"; second, a column written by Joseph Kraft and published in the Washington Post of recent date entitled, "Fulbright and His Critics"; third, a column written by Walter Lippmann entitled, "Soviet-American Relations," which was published in the Washington Post on September 28, 1965; fourth, a column under the byline of Marquis Childs, entitled "Tyranny of the Majority in United States," which appeared in the Washington Post on September 27; and, finally, an editorial entitled "Defending Intervention," which appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch during the week of September 20-26.

There being no objection, the articles and editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE SPEECHMAKER: SENATOR FULBRIGHT AS THE ARKANSAS DE TOCQUEVILLE
(By Andrew Kopkind)

For his troubles in detailing the errors of U.S. foreign policy, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT has been rewarded with a congressional resolution compounding the error and doubling his troubles. A few days after Fulbright delivered a characteristically long, intelligent, and eloquent condemnation of American intervention in the Dominican Revolution, the House of Representatives passed (312 to 52) a sentimental endorsement of armed intervention anywhere in Latin America in the event of "subversive domination or the threat of it." The rebuke had the tacit approval of the State Department and bipartisan support of the House leadership.

It is not unusual for Fulbright to find himself on the short side of a 6-to-1 vote, and in his own way he derives a certain moral superiority from being a minority of one. "More than a hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville warned us . . . of the dangers that might be expected from the 'tyranny of the majority.' This is the tyranny that presently is growing in our country," Fulbright said in a doom-laden speech on McCarthyism 11 years ago. Last week, privately, he repeated the same phrase, and predicted the same doom. He made his Senate speech not as a political leader but as an elder statesman-without-portfolio, an Arkansas de Tocqueville whose job it is not to make policy but to report it, and by reporting, influence in some small way its future course.

He has no taste for the heat of battle or the pitch of crisis. "At this time of relative calm," his speech began, "it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the United States role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future." Fulbright removed himself as much as he could from the onus of personal criticism: President Johnson's decision to send 20,000 troops to Santo Domingo was understandable under the circumstances. There were "No easy choices. Nonetheless, it is the task of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis."

The blame could not be placed on the President but was laid squarely on the sources of information: the CIA, State Department, intelligence, and U.S. Embassy officials in Santo Domingo. The lack of reliable information—it was inadequate and inaccurate—gets congressional leaders off the hook, too. Fulbright and the usual collection of Senators and Representatives concerned with

foreign policy were called to the White House during the crisis, told the President's plans, and, in effect, asked to ratify the decision to intervene. They offered no opposition, either because they agreed with the President, or (like Fulbright, perhaps uniquely) they had no independent source of information on which to base any instinctive doubts.

Fulbright got the opposite of help from the White House. "The whole affair . . .," Fulbright said, "has been characterized by a lack of candor." He was told at the White House that hundreds or thousands of American lives were in danger, and that the protection of these compatriots was the reason for intervention. Later, he said, he knew that it was not exactly the case: "The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention," he said. "The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated."

There was no doubt about whose bad judgment it was. Fulbright conceived the Dominican episode as a "classic study" of policymaking with the "inevitability of a Greek tragedy." The antagonist was the American Ambassador in Santo Domingo, W. Tapley Bennett. It was he who refused to help the supporters of deposed President Bosch when they pleaded for a U.S. presence on April 25, the second day of the revolution, and it was he who refused U.S. mediation on April 27, when the rebels sought a negotiated settlement.

FULL SPEED AHEAD

Instead, Bennett seemed intent on helping the military junta stay in power. General Wessin y Wessin shot off a telegram to Washington accusing his opponents of being Communists. A quick check could only turn up three Communists, and Wessin was told that the reasons for intervention were not good enough. Only a threat to American lives would bring American troops. Several minutes later, thus prompted, Wessin discovered a threat to American lives. That was all that was needed; the troopships were already speeding toward Santo Domingo. It did not take long to see just how exaggerated the danger was; in fact, no American lives were lost until the marines landed. But by that time, someone found 55, or 58, or 77 verifiable Communists, some of them alive and some of them dead, some of them in the country and some of them out, some of them pro-Castro, some pro-Peiping, and some pro-Moscow, who could be associated with the revolution. Association soon became "control," and the United States had to put the country under military command.

Fulbright slowly amassed these facts in 6 weeks and 13 sessions of secret Foreign Relations Committee hearings this summer, to which almost every administration official concerned with the intervention was invited. A great many came. McGeorge Bundy politely refused. Ambassador Bennett testified and was asked about those telegrams from General Wessin y Wessin; Bennett did not remember the episode, offhand. Other witnesses had better memories. Fulbright was well prepared; the committee staff is one of the best in Congress, and it organized surveys and chronologies of the crisis from a wide variety of sources. So much so, in fact, that opponents of Fulbright thought they detected some kind of conspiracy. "Someone had prepared a sheaf of cards, I should say 1 1/2 inches thick," Senator LAUSCH reported darkly of the hearings. "When the witnesses appeared, the questions on the cards were systematically asked. One question was read, and the card was turned over. Then the second question was read, and the third." The giveaway was the systematizing. LAUSCH was not alone in catching it.

SUPPORT GROWING FOR SENATOR FULBRIGHT IN HIS VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in my judgment, a consensus of informed opinion in this country is developing in support of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], both in his view that debate on foreign policy is a necessary part of our democratic process and in his further view that our activities in the Dominican Republic have brought us an unnecessary amount of trouble with nations in Latin America which should be our best friends.

I also note with dismay a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives under the leadership of Representative SELDEN, which would seem to indicate that the United States believes it has a right to intervene unilaterally, with force, in any Latin American country where, in our opinion, there is a threat of a Communist takeover.

The resolution which was adopted, so far as I can tell, without any effective opposition from the State Department, has caused a furor in Latin America almost equal to that caused by our overreaction to the Dominican Republic crisis.

I would hope that in short order the State Department would undertake to issue a statement, which I am confident a number of members of the Foreign Relations Committee—possibly a majority—would approve, which would indicate a return to the sound basis of standing firmly behind our treaty commitments entered into with our fellow members of the Organization of American States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the following articles and editorials which confirm the point of view which I have endeavored to express briefly this afternoon: